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Abstract—This paper reports a novel approach that uses
transistor aging in an integrated circuit (IC) to detect hardware
Trojans. When a transistor is aged, it results in delays along
several paths of the IC. This increase in delay results in timing
violations that reveal as timing errors at the output of the IC
during its operation. We present experiments using aging-aware
standard cell libraries to illustrate the usefulness of the technique
in detecting hardware Trojans. Combining IC aging with over-
clocking produces a pattern of bit errors at the IC output by the
induced timing violations. We use machine learning to learn the
bit error distribution at the output of a clean IC. We differentiate
the divergence in the pattern of bit errors because of a Trojan
in the IC from this baseline distribution. We simulate the golden
IC and show robustness to IC-to-IC manufacturing variations.
The approach is effective and can detect a Trojan even if we
place it far off the critical paths. Results on benchmarks from
the Trust-hub show a detection accuracy of ≥99%.
Index Terms—Hardware Trojan Detection, Machine Learning,
Over-clocking, Transistor Aging.
I. INTRODUCTION
Manufacturing of ICs is expensive and requires special
fabrication equipment that becomes outdated in a short time.
To reduce the cost of IC manufacturing, this task is typically
outsourced to offshore IC foundries. In a related trend, embed-
ded systems source specialized intellectual property (IP) cores
from different vendors. Design and assembly of the IP cores
is done using third party computer aided design, integration,
and test tools. As an IC design travels through the complicated
supply chain, the IC could be corrupted at one of the stages.
Example threats due to the corruption include passing off low
quality ICs as good, infiltrating the supply chain with imitation
ICs, and insertion of Hardware Trojans in ICs. Hardware
Trojans, which are typically triggered by rare events, may
alter function, deny service, or leak information. Such infected
ICs affect the critical information systems in finance, military,
and health care. Functional and structural tests to weed out
manufacture-time defects are ineffective against Trojans for
the following reasons:
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1) Structural tests produced by automatic test pattern gen-
eration (ATPG) may not detect a Trojan, since the
behaviour of the Trojan may not be in the fault list [1].
2) Functional tests do not uncover Trojans since they
trigger on rare events.
3) A brute force application of all inputs does not scale.
For example, a 64-bit circuit will need 264 inputs.
Reverse engineering can authenticate the IC but it does not
guarantee that the unchecked ICs do not have Trojans [2].
There are different types of Trojans, depending on their
functionality. Some leak information, some change function,
and some discharge power, etc. Therefore, a robust approach
is needed to detect Trojans. Prior work [3]–[7] has considered
side channel and ATPG test pattern analysis. Power side
channel fingerprinting is not a reliable method for detecting
Trojans within a large circuit. In classic VLSI test, even if
the test patterns cover all corner cases, they may not trigger
a Trojan. For example, the trigger could be inputs applied
in a particular sequence, which is extremely challenging to
replicate. We explore aging for Trojan detection. In transistor
aging, we do not need the Trojan to be triggered because the
underlying aging mechanism will naturally occur during the
circuit’s operation. From results (see Section VII), aging can
detect small Trojans (occupying 0.22% of the circuit) and even
if it is about 4000 paths far from critical path.
In this work, transistor aging along with over-clocking is
used to expose the Trojan effects on various circuit properties.
When aging and over-clocking are jointly applied to an IC,
they produce a pattern of bit errors at the output. The output
bit error patterns for clean IC are used train a Support Vector
Machine to learn the clean IC output pattern distribution
to determine presence of Trojan at the test time. The ef-
ficacy of our approach is shown on gate-level simulations
on Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and Rivest-Shamir-
Adleman (RSA) crypto circuits with different Trojans that
show different challenges using aging-induced standard cell
libraries. This method applies to any circuit but the crypto
circuits are used for secure data transmission and hence are
subject to attacks. The Trojans appear at different locations
corresponding to the rank of the critical path. The experimental
results show an accuracy of over 99% on all the circuits when
considered with varying number of inputs.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses prior
work on Trojans. Section III describes transistor aging and
its effects. Section IV overviews the creation of aging-aware
standard cell libraries. Section V introduces our approach and
Sections VI and VII outline the experimental setup and results.
Section VIII draws the conclusions.
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2II. RELATED WORK
A. Hardware Trojans
Globalization has led to a distributed IC manufacturing
environment. The globally-distributed IC design cycle has led
to a lot of vulnerabilities, including Hardware Trojans. A
Hardware Trojan is a malicious modification to the circuit,
which is unknown to the designer and can have consequences
like incorrect functionality, loss of secret information, etc.
Hardware Trojans are critical threats to military, finance,
transportation and corporate or consumer electronics [8]. A
Hardware Trojan has two parts – trigger and payload. Trigger
signal activates the Trojan. Payload is the effect of the Trojan.
A trigger is a signal in the circuit which is rarely activated. As
a result, the payload is dormant during normal function of the
circuit. Hence, the Trojan is difficult to detect. Trojans can be
classified based on five attributes: insertion phase, abstraction
level, location, trigger and payload [9], [10].
Trojans can be inserted in various stages of a design flow.
Semiconductor companies use third party EDA tools, third
party IPs (3PIPs), and untrusted foundries. Insertion of Trojans
at various stages of EDA design flow has been demonstrated
by [11]. Insertion of Trojans during High-level Synthesis was
proposed by [12]. [13] designed a malicious processor by
modifying the open source Leon processor. The Trojans allow
a user to violate Operating System exceptions and execute a
malicious firmware. Don’t care states in a design were utilized
to trigger Hardware Trojans by [14]. [15] triggers Trojans by
exploiting silicon wear-out.
B. Trojan Detection
Trojan detection methods are usually applied either at the
design stage or post-manufacturing stage to verify them [16].
Pre-silicon detection approaches are used to validate 3PIP
cores before integrating them to a design. Pre-silicon verifica-
tion is performed using functional validation, structural anal-
ysis or formal verification. Functional validation methods use
functional tests to activate a Trojan and validate the response
against a “golden” Trojan-free circuit response. Since Trojan
triggers are rarely turned on, researchers have developed test
generation techniques that can activate those rare triggers [3],
[4]. However, functional tests fail to detect a non-functional
Trojan which does not alter the function of the circuit and
transmits secret data. Structural analysis involves identifying
redundant statements and circuits in the HDL code [15], [17].
Post-silicon Trojan detection involves either destructive or
non-destructive testing. Destructive testing implies reverse-
engineering and de-layering to detect the presence of malicious
circuitry [16]. Although this approach is costly, time consum-
ing and renders the IC useless, it guarantees Trojan detection in
the single IC. Non-destructive methods use functional testing
(similar to pre-silicon Trojan detection) and side-channel anal-
ysis. The value of a side-channel parameter will differ between
a Trojan activated circuit and a “golden” circuit. In [18], path
delay information of the IC at each output is considered to
generate a path delay fingerprint. The path delay fingerprints
help distinguish between clean IC and Trojaned IC. There are
millions of paths in ICs nowadays, it is not practical to measure
the delay for all the paths. Also, the method does not work well
for the Trojans that leak information through side channels.
Temperature tracking using on-chip thermal sensors during
run-time is an option [6], [19], [20]. However, if the Trojan
activity lasts for a short duration, the slow rate of thermal
variation cannot detect the Trojan. Furthermore, adversary can
place the Trojan in an active area of the chip. This makes the
Trojan detection difficult. In [5], leakage current measurement
detects Trojans since additional gates consume extra leakage
power. In [7], Picosecond Imaging Circuit Analysis (PICA)
is used to measure optical emissions of the ICs and compare
them with a trusted emission image of a “golden” IC. In both
the methods (i.e., power and radiation), access to “golden
IC” is required and as the feature size of IC shrinks, the
deviation from “golden” IC due to process variations become
pronounced, compensating for the deviations introduced by the
Trojans. Our method does not need a “golden IC”. We simulate
the circuit for the golden IC and show robustness of the
technique to IC-to-IC manufacturing variations. The approach
is aging-based, non-destructive and can detect a Trojan even
if it is dormant, removing the above limitations.
III. TRANSISTOR AGING
Semiconductor technology has advanced to the nanometer
regime wherein electric fields are stronger with every new
generation to allow the transistor to switch faster. When an
IC is turned ON, the Bias Temperature Instability (BTI) effect
comes into play and increases the threshold voltage (∆Vth) of
transistors. The magnitude of (∆Vth) depends on the supply
voltage (Vdd). High Vdd causes a large increase in Vth, thus
increasing the delay of paths of circuit leading to a noticeable
performance degradation. Modern ICs use fast voltage regu-
lator (switching between voltage levels in less than a micro
second) to implement effective power management schemes in
which the overhead of voltage scaling is minimized. The high
frequency of voltage switching does not allow for degradation
accumulated at high Vdd to settle down (i.e. to recover) at low
Vdd. This causes transient timing errors due to aging until the
transient state disappears in which generated defects, caused
by BTI aging at the high Vdd, partially or fully recover. This is
known as short-term aging [21]. Switching voltage from low
Vdd to high Vdd does not cause aging effects as the degradation
at low Vdd is less and the circuits get more robust at high Vdd.
A. Effects of Transistor Aging
Technology scaling is approaching its limits displacing a
few atoms in a transistor during operation is akin to aging
and can endanger their key electrical properties. The key
aging phenomena are Negative and Positive Bias Temperature
Instabilities (NBTI and PBTI), with a potential to degrade the
switching speed of pMOS and nMOS transistors. BTI occurs
when the vertical electric field is applied to the transistor in
which some of the minority carriers –that are being attracted
to form the transistor’s channel– may combine with the
available Si-H bonds at the Si-SiO2 interface layer resulting
in interface traps. Some of these carriers may move to the
transistor’s dielectric due to quantum tunneling and captured
3by the oxide vacancies resulting in oxide traps. These defects
interfere with the applied electric field and weaken it due
to Coulomb scattering. As a result, the transistor can switch
from OFF to ON state only at a higher gate voltage than
the fresh device (i.e. in the absence of aging). Hence, the
threshold voltage (Vth) of the transistor increases. In addition,
the generated interface traps reduce the mobility of carriers (µ)
as they move from source to drain due to Coulomb scattering.
Aging-Induced Timing Errors: The delay of a transistor is
proportional to its current in the ON state (ION ). ION is a
function of the threshold voltage and the carrier mobility as
in Eq. 1 [22]. An increase in Vth plus a decrease in µ due to
aging reduces ION and increases transistor delay.
Transistor delay td =
1
ION
; ION ≈ µ
2
·Cox ·W
L
·(Vdd−Vth)2
(1)
where, Cox, W and L are oxide capacitance, width, and length
of transistor. Vdd, Vth, and µ are operating voltage, threshold
voltage, and carrier mobility, respectively.
Aged transistors slowdown increasing the likelihood of
timing violations and errors in circuits, as shown in Eq. 2,
if no (or in-sufficient) timing guard band is included. This is
because the switching frequency is unsustainable causing tim-
ing violations in critical paths and these.propagate to outputs
manifesting as errors.
tCP =
∑
di∈CP
tdi , tCP (aging) > tclock ⇒ timing errors !
The Hidden Impact of Voltage Scaling: From Eq. 1, the
impact of aging-induced ∆Vth largely depends on the oper-
ating voltage (Vdd). Therefore, the same increase in Vth due
to aging (e.g., 25mV) can result in a much larger degradation
in ION and thus in the transistor speed when Vdd is scaled
down. The timing errors that the circuit will exhibit, under
aging effects, are subject to aging-induced degradation (Vth,
µ) and operating voltage (Vdd). The combination magnifies the
impact of aging and shifts the aging problem from a sole long-
term degradation (i.e. a degradation that may take months to
cause timing errors in circuits) to a short-term degradation
(i.e. a degradation that might need merely hours to cause
timing errors). Such a magnification in the impact of aging
can point to using this as a knob to detect Trojans. In this
study, we consider the relatively longer-term aging (at multiple
controllable levels of aging) that can be induced by the various
aging effects discussed above.
B. Combining Circuit Aging With Over-Clocking
Aging alone does not create sufficient delay in a circuit
path for the timing errors to propagate to the output. To
check this hypothesis, we generated the outputs for the clean
and Trojan-inserted IC using a nominal clock (i.e., without
over-clocking) with different states of aging (i.e with different
aging-induced ∆Vth). The difference in outputs for both the
cases is insufficient to detect a Trojan.
Similarly, over-clocking alone does not create significant
bit-error patterns at the output. When the Trojan is placed
far from the critical path, over-clocking does not generate a
distinguishable signature of errors. We apply an ML classifier
on over-clocking only data to see if it can detect a Trojan on
the critical path. The results show a false negative rate ≥50%.
Windowing over multiple input vectors and majority voting
during testing does not help. False negative rate increases when
multiple input vectors are used to test.
Combining transistor aging with over-clocking generates a
distinguishable signature of timing errors at the IC output
and this can be used to detect Trojans with a high accuracy.
Implementing and demonstrating this idea is the key novel
contribution of this paper.
In a nutshell, the delay caused due to aging alone is
insufficient to produce bit errors at the output of an IC. Also,
ICs include a timing guard band to ensure reliability. By over-
clocking, we either narrow or remove the timing guard band.
Over-clocking in combination with aging creates a robust
signature of bit-error patterns at the output.
IV. AGING-AWARE CELL LIBRARIES: BRIDGING
THE
GAP BETWEEN PHYSICS AND SYSTEM LEVEL
Aging is “driven” by different underlying mechanisms of
defect generation that occur at the atomic level. In order
to investigate and quantify how such defects may propagate
all the way up to the system level, where they manifest
as timing errors, the intervening abstraction layers must be
carefully traversed. In addition, real digital circuits typically
consist of numerous paths, which are all similar to each other
with respect to overall delay. Therefore, when aging-induced
degradation takes place, it is challenging to accurately quantify
how the timing paths will be violated and how such violations
will translate into errors at the circuit outputs. This necessitates
an accurate modeling of how standard cells will behave in
the presence of aging degradations. Any investigation in this
direction requires that we use commercial tool flows for static
timing analysis in order to rely on their underlying mature
algorithms evolved over decades. Otherwise, the impact of
aging-induced degradation on the delay of paths cannot be
accurately captured and, more importantly, any proposed tech-
nique would not be compilable with the existing standard
design flow of circuits.
To address these challenges, we create “aging-aware cell
libraries” in which the delay of standard cells are characterized
by considering the effects that aging-induced defects have
on the electrical properties of pMOS and nMOS transistors,
similar to [22], [23]. We start from the lowest level of
abstraction where we employ state-of-the art physics-based
BTI aging models to estimate the defects in pMOS and nMOS
transistor and how they result in shifts in the transistor’s
parameters (i.e. Vth and µ) [24]. Then, we employ SPICE
simulation to estimate the delay and power of every standard
cell considering the effects that ∆Vth and ∆µ on the delay of
the nMOS and pMOS transistors. We analyze every standard
cell with 7×7 input signal slews and output load capacitances1.
All the generated data is stored using the “liberty” format,
1This is how it is done in commercial standard cell libraries.
4Fig. 1: Stages in the IC design flow where a Hardware Trojan can be inserted.
which is the standard format for existing commercial EDA
tool flows (e.g., Synopsys and Cadence). To cover a wide range
of aging effects, we create the aging-aware cell libraries for
a various aging stress conditions (i.e. various duty cycles 2).
We start from 0% representing no aging all the way to 100%
representing the maximum aging that considers a continuous
aging stress without any recovery, in steps of 10%. These
standard cell libraries are compatible with EDA tool flows
like Synopsys and Cadence. Hence, designers can plug them
directly within the commercial static timing analysis tools for
accurate timing analysis.
Implementation Details: We target the 45nm technology
node. The methodology and implementation is not limited
and applies to advance technology nodes. We employ state-of-
the-art physics-based aging model [24], which were validated
against semiconductor measurements. They capture the defect
generation of BTI aging under any stress condition. The
physics models support all technology nodes and different
transistor structures such as FinFETs. To create the stan-
dard cell library, we used the open-source 45nm nangate
library [25]. The library provides SPICE netlist for sequential
and combinational standard cells. For SPICE simulations we
use open-source Predictive Transistor Model (PTM) [26].
V. PROPOSED METHODOLOGY
Consider an IC that performs a function f at a nominal
operating clock. When an input x is applied to the IC, it
generates an expected output f(x) as long as the IC is
operating normally (i.e., operating without timing errors). If
the IC is run on a faster clock (higher frequency), it alters
its functionality causing mis-matches (e.g., bit errors, longer
settling times) in the observed outputs due to the induced
timing violations. If the logic gates of the IC age and slow
down, the results take more time to propagate and reach the
output bus and the observed output behavior will be different
from expected because of timing errors. Aging induces a delay
increase in the IC, which then results in transient timing errors.
If the clock period is small enough to propagate the errors
to the output, the output bits will differ from the expected
2Duty cycle is the % of operation time for which the transistor is ON.
outputs. This change in the output bit patterns helps detect
extra circuits such as Hardware Trojan. Timing guard band
is not used in this study. It is used during the operation of a
chip and is not a consideration for the detection mechanism.
The maximum clock frequency is purposefully violated by
overclocking the circuit.
To validate this hypothesis using simulations, we create
standard cell libraries as described in Section IV that consider
aging effects by using the degradation of threshold voltage
(Vth) and carrier mobility (µ) in nMOS and pMOS transistors.
We created standard cell libraries for different stresses of duty
cycle from 0% - 100% in steps of 10%. A duty cycle of 100%
refers to 100% aging stress and 0 refers to no aging.
We consider attacks pre-synthesis (RTL) and post-synthesis
(gate-level netlist). In the case of post-synthesis Trojan inser-
tion, the attacker can be either the designer or the fabrication
company. For the RTL attack, we assume that we have access
to the genuine RTL that is corrupted before proceeding to
synthesis. For Trojan insertion post synthesis, the RTL without
the Trojan is synthesized to produce a gate-level netlist and
the Trojan is inserted within the netlist to get a corrupted,
Trojaned netlist. We use the aging-aware standard cell libraries
and the (clean and corrupted) gate-level netlists as inputs to
a static timing analysis tool to generate the standard delay
format (SDF) files for the different aging states. The SDF
file reports the exact delay of every logic gate in the netlist.
We generate a set of inputs and their outputs for the baseline
IC using gate-level simulations. This set of inputs includes
randomly generated inputs as well as input test patterns gener-
ated by Synopsys Tetramax Automatic Test Pattern Generator
(ATPG) [27] tool. We generate these input-output pairs for
combinations of aging states and clock frequencies using gate-
level simulations (with SDF annotations). We then develop a
machine learning approach (discussed in Sections V-A, V-B)
to compare the observed bit error patterns at the circuit output
with the expected bit error patterns trained from a known-
good device/simulation. Figure 1 shows the stages where a
hardware Trojan can be inserted. Our ML classifier detects all
the Trojans. We obtain the maximum clock period for an IC
using static timing analysis and generate input/output dataset
for smaller clock periods that create pronounced output bit-
5Fig. 2: ML-based detection of ICs with a Trojan.
error patterns.
A. Feature Extraction for Machine Learning
The Hardware Trojan detection methodology is based on ap-
plying inputs to the IC, observing the outputs for several clock
periods and aging states, and comparing the observed output
variations with “baseline” characteristics to detect anomalies
that indicate presence of Trojans. A one-class classifier based
on an auto-encoder and a one-class Support Vector Machine
(SVM) is proposed as shown in Figure 2.
To train a model using the baseline characteristics, we
consider a set of inputs xT . For each input x ∈ xT , the
output is recorded3 for a range of clock periods and aging
states. Denoting clock periods by t1, . . . , tnC and aging states
by a1, . . . , anA , the output for i
th clock period and jth aging
state is denoted as hij(x). The clock periods t1, . . . , tnC , span
significantly lower than the highest sustainable clock period
under normal conditions4 While the higher number of bit
errors are expected at a higher clock, some bit errors are
possible at higher than nominal clock in high-aging states.
Given input x, the expected output is denoted by y0 = f(x).
Given an input x, the expected output f(x) is deterministic,
while the measured outputs hij(x) are stochastic, when the
IC is over-clocked and aged. IC-to-IC variations add to the
variability of hij(x). To account for variability and achieve
robust anomaly detection, we do not simply learn mappings
from inputs to expected outputs. Rather, we learn a deeper
model of how the observed outputs (i.e., observed bit error
patterns) vary with over-clocking and aging. The trained
3After a number of cycles sufficient to read output in normal operation.
4Nominal clock derived from slack analysis by Synopsys Primetime.
classifier does not compare measured with expected outputs.
It uses the variation in patterns of bit errors as a signature
for the IC and learns a model of the characteristics of these
variations (independent of the applied inputs). Hence, inputs
used during testing of an IC are independent of inputs used
in training (see Section VII).
Given an input x, the expected output y0 = f(x), and a
measured output y = hij(x) for the ith clock period and the
jth aging state, the mismatch between y and y0 is measured
by a set of four features: number of 0→1 bit flips, 1→0 bit
flips and weighted combinations of 0→1 and 1→0 bit flips
considering their bit locations. Denote the bit length of the
output (i.e., y or y0) as m and given any binary number a
of bit length m, define the “bit indicator functions” 1(a) and
0(a) as the subsets of M = {0, . . . ,m− 1}, given by
1(a) = {r ∈M|a&2r > 0} (2)
0(a) = {r ∈M|a&2r = 0} (3)
where & is the bit-wise AND. 1(a) and 0(a) capture subsets
of bit locations in {0, . . . ,m−1} corresponding to 1 or 0 bits
in a. Given y, y0, the feature vector is defined as
f1(y, y0) =
∑
r∈(0(y0)∩1(y))
1 (4)
f2(y, y0) =
∑
r∈(1(y0)∩0(y))
1 (5)
f3(y, y0) =
∑
r∈(0(y0)∩1(y))
2r (6)
f4(y, y0) =
∑
r∈(1(y0)∩0(y))
2r (7)
F (y, y0) = [f1(y, y0), f2(y, y0),
f3(y, y0), f4(y, y0)]
T ∈ RnF ;nF = 4 (8)
Using the feature vector F (., .), a three-dimension feature
tensor is defined to characterize variations of bit errors over
the set of clock periods and aging states. Given input x,
expected output y0 = f(x), and measured outputs {hij(x), i =
1, . . . , nC ; j = 1, . . . , nA}, the three-dimensional tensor F (x)
of dimension nC × nA × nF is defined where its (i, j, k)th
element is the kth element of F (hij(x), y0).
Figure 3 visualizes the feature tensor computation across
clock periods and aging states for RSA circuit (Trojan inserted
in the nelist). The figure shows the features extracted at the
different clock periods and aging states for an input as a heat
map. Although the feature values for clean and Trojaned ICs
look similar, the classifier can distinguish a clean IC from a
Trojaned one (see Section VII). From left to right in each of
the plots, the aging stress increases from 0% to 100% and
the Y-axis represents different clock periods and the over-
clocking is more towards the bottom. The four plots in each
column show the four types of features as discussed above.
They correspond to (from the top) the number of 0→1 bit
flips, number of 1→0 bit flips, weighted combinations of 0→1
and 1→0 bit flips considering their bit locations, respectively.
The heat map shows how the features are varying with aging
stress and clock periods as well as the difference between a
clean IC and Trojaned IC. Lighter colour indicates that the
6particular kind of feature at the given clock period and aging
stress is more pronounced.
B. Machine Learning for Trojan Detection
To train the anomaly detector, the feature tensors F (x)
are generated for each input x in the training set xT . We
combine features from multiple inputs by taking a window of
size 1 during training for better accuracy in detecting Trojans.
From the set {F (x), x ∈ xT }, we train a one-class classifier
for outlier detection. Given a feature tensor computed from
outputs measured from an IC under test, the trained classifier
determines if the feature tensor is “different (outlier)” from
that for a Trojan-free IC. A one-class classifier based on an
autoencoder and a one-class SVM is used (Figure 2). From the
feature tensor of dimension nC ×nA×nF , a compact feature
representation is computed using a four-layer autoencoder
having a two-layer encoder and a two-layer decoder with
ReLU activations. The feature vector from the hidden layer
of autoencoder is input to a one-class SVM.
When testing an IC, inputs x˜ in a test set x˜T are applied to
the IC and the outputs yij = hij(x˜) are measured for the ith
clock period and jth aging state. Feature vectors F (yij , f(x˜))
and the feature tensor F (x˜) are extracted. The feature tensor
is passed through the trained autoencoder to extract a low-
dimensional feature vector which is then passed through a
one-class SVM. The test set x˜T can be disjoint from or
overlap with the training set xT . In either case, the anomaly
detector is input-independent and does not rely on matching
actual values of outputs, but on feature patterns of bit error
variations across clock periods and aging states. Since the
detector operates on a feature tensor extracted from outputs
measured for a single input, applying one input x˜ is sufficient
for inlier/outlier determination. However, to improve accuracy,
multiple inputs x˜ plus majority voting is used to generate the
inlier/outlier estimate. Section VII shows that ≥ 95% accuracy
of inlier/outlier determinations of clean vs. Trojan-inserted
ICs) are obtained with a single input. Majority voting with
multiple inputs improves it to 100%.
In summary, the approach implemented is as follows:
• Training: A simulated model of the baseline (Trojan-
free) IC is used to train using a set of inputs which
is a combination of random and ATPG-generated inputs
and a predefined set of operating condition tuples (e.g.
clock frequency, aging state) are applied to the IC. For
each of the conditions, inputs are applied and outputs are
measured. The feature vectors are generated from each of
the measured output to train the SVM. The feature vectors
for challenging Trojans are enhanced by collecting the
features over a set of inputs (called a bin).
• The testing procedure is similar to the training. We collect
input-output measurements at different clock frequencies
and aging states. Testing is done on the baseline and
Trojan ICs to measure accuracy of the classifier. To
improve accuracy for the challenging Trojans, the number
of bins (called a batch) used for testing at a time is
increased. We use a batch of 5 bins during training.
• Implementation: In the deployment site, same procedure
as during testing is used. Different clock frequencies and
aging states (i.e., operating condition) can be applied to
the IC under test and input-output measurements with
a batch of inputs at each operating condition can be
collected. The extracted features are run through the
classifier to determine if the IC is Trojaned or not.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
A. Trojan Benchmarks Used in the Study
We use the following 32-bit RSA and the 128-bit AES
circuits from the Trust-Hub [28].
• The Basic RSA-T100 benchmark implements a Shift-and-
Add algorithm for modular multiplication. The trigger
checks for an input and activates the Trojan when this is
found on the input bus. The Trojan leaks the secret key
(private exponent) through output bus. Figure 4 shows
the gate-level netlist of the synthesized RSA circuit with
a Trojan (the Trojan is inserted at the RTL). The Trojan
occupies 0.75% of the IC area.
• The AES-T100 uses a 128-bit key. In the baseline AES,
the plaintext goes through 10 rounds of substitution,
mix column, and shift rows. The AES-T100 Trojan is
always on. The Trojan leaks bits from the secret key.
The eight least significant bits are leaked through power
side channel before which they are XORed with the bits
generated from Linear-Feedback Shift Register (LFSR).
This modification to the key obfuscates the power read-
ings which allows only the adversary to recover the key.
• The AES-T1000 benchmark uses a 128-bit key and has
a trigger similar to Basic RSA-T100. The Trojan leaks
the key using the technique similar to AES-T100. The
difference is that the AES-T1000 has a Trojan trigger.
B. Synthesis and Simulation
We use Synopsys Design Compiler [29] and a 45 nm
technology library operating at 1.1V, 25 oC (see Section IV)
without aging to synthesize the baseline and the Trojan circuit
(RTL from Trust-Hub) to produce gate-level netlists. The
netlist of the baseline circuit and the Trojan are combined
to produce a netlist with a Trojan so as to keep the original
circuit unchanged. Synopsys Primetime [30] is used along with
45 nm technology with different percentages of aging stress
to create SDF files, each for a case of aging stress, using the
netlists created for Trojan-free and Trojaned circuits. The gate-
level simulations at different clock periods is performed using
Synopsys VCS [31]. Figure 5 shows the tool flow.
C. SVM-based Machine Learning
A one-class SVM is trained to learn bit error patterns
produced at the outputs (details in Section 2); therefore,
detecting Trojans. Features are extracted for one input at a
time to train the classifier in Experiment 1. The number of
input vectors used for windowing over features is denoted by k
(size of bin) and we will empirically show that k = 5 provides
improved accuracy to detect the more challenging Trojans.
7Fig. 3: Visualization of features for different aging states (duty cycle 0% =⇒ no aging and a duty cycle 100% =⇒ maximum
aging) and clock periods for clean IC (left) and Trojaned IC (right) for RSA (when Trojan is inserted into the netlist).
Fig. 4: Gate-level circuit of synthesized Trojan-infected RSA
circuit. The Trojan is contained in the red area of Figure.
D. Modeling IC-to-IC Variations
IC-to-IC delay variations due to temperature, pressure dif-
ferences during manufacturing of ICs is also considered and
addressed. These variations are modeled by altering the delay
parameters of the gates in the SDF files that are caused by
each of the aging states. There are two types of variations in
ICs - 1) IC-to-IC variation and 2) on-chip variation (die-to-
die). The variations in delay from IC to IC can be typically
5% or more [32]. The change that we applied to the SDF files
is as follows: 1) 5% change in each parameter to model IC-to-
IC variation, and 2) Gaussian random variations of zero mean
and 4% standard deviation (σ) to model on-chip variations.
The combined effect corresponds to variations of up to 17%
(considering 3σ plus 5% as in the first case). At advanced
technology nodes, the percentage variation in delay due to
manufacturing process increases and aging effects become
pronounced, as has been demonstrated in Intel measurements
for the 14nm FinFET technology [33].
VII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We show the efficacy of our approach on three Trojaned
circuits from the Trust-Hub [28]: 1) BasicRSA-T100 (Exper-
iments 1 and 2), 2) AES-T100 (Experiment 3) , and 3) AES-
T1000 (Experiment 4). The Trojan sits on the critical path
8Fig. 5: The CAD tool flow. The CAD tools used are in
blue background. The RTL design stage where the attack can
happen is in red. The steps used to create aging-aware SDF
files are in purple. The simulation steps are in green.
for BasicRSA-T100 and about 4209 paths (rank of the path)
off of the critical path for the AES-T100 and 2753 paths
(rank of the path) off the critical path for the AES-T1000.
Therefore, the detection of the Trojan in the AES circuit is
much more challenging. To train and test the classifiers, we
build a corpus of datasets with overclocking and aging. To
show that overclocking is insufficient on its own even on the
simplest circuit with Trojan on the critical path, we collect
data for the BasicRSA-T100 using overclocking only as well.
We also show results for BasicRSA-T100 when the Trojan is
inserted at the RTL and netlist. This is due to the fact that
the synthesized circuit changes considerably when insertion is
performed at the RTL level; therefore, the Trojan detection will
be easier. However, in AES-T100 and AES-T1000, only a side
channel Trojan (no feedback to the original circuit) is included
and therefore injection of the Trojan into RTL will not change
the original circuit once synthesized. In all these cases, we use
the data from Trojan-free ICs to train and the data from the
Trojaned ICs to test. The inputs used during training are not
re-used for testing to make sure that the classifier indeed learns
useful patterns. Trojans in the training and testing dataset are
kept dormant (except in Experiment 3 but the Trojan does not
affect the output bits in Experiment 3) to make the problem
challenging. The training and testing (which are offline) phases
require larger dataset than during deployment (i.e., inference).
The number of input-output pairs of data collected for each of
the circuits is between 4000 and 4300 which takes a few kilo
bytes to store. The features collected over the data also is not
more than a few hundred kilo bytes. The training is offline and
needs to be done only once per circuit. It takes roughly five
minutes to train each of the circuits. For testing and inference
phases, the computations are not complex and does not take
more than a few seconds.
A. Experiment 1: Basic RSA-T100 Trojan Inserted into RTL
The baseline RSA circuit when synthesized has a clock
period of 2.17 ns. The Trojan occupies 0.75% of the circuit.
For the Trojaned and baseline ICs, we collect two sets of data:
1) Overclocking with aging: We over-clock the RSA
circuit and collect data by sweeping the overclocking
in the range 1.125 ns - 1.4 ns with a step of 0.005 ns
for Trojan and Trojan-Free cases and for all aging states.
2) Overclocking without aging: We over-clock the RSA
circuit and collect input/output data in the range 0.9 ns
– 1.4 ns in steps of 0.005 ns without considering the
aging effects for clean and Trojaned ICs.
The data set is generated for 4226 inputs. Of these, 4096
are random patterns and 130 are ATPG patterns for the clean
RSA circuit. We extracted four types of features (details in
Section V-A). Figures 6(a), 6(b) show the histograms of bit
flips at the outputs for the no-aging case of RSA circuit with
Trojan inserted at RTL. Figures 7(a), 7(b) show the histograms
for the maximum aging case. The bit flips largely depend on
the inputs and the key used in RSA algorithm. Depending on
the positions of bits in the inputs and the key used by the
algorithm, each bit will have a different path from the input
port to the output port. Additionally, when aging is applied to
the circuit, it induces more delay in several paths that leads
to an increase in number of bit flips. This is evident from the
figures in which the histograms shifted towards right when
aging is applied. Figures 8(a), 8(b) and Figures 9(a), 9(b) show
the bar charts of the weighted location of bit flips for no and
maximum aging, respectively. The locations of bit flips has
changed from no aging case to worst aging case and from no
Trojan case to the Trojan inserted case as discussed. These
figures show that the chosen features provide a discernible
difference when a Trojan is inserted.
In case of overclocking with aging, we use half of 4226
inputs for training and the other half for testing. When a single
input is used for training, the accuracy is 99.3% on a clean
IC and 100% for a Trojaned IC as shown in Figures 10(a),
10(b). False positive rate is 1.4% and false negative rate is
0%. When a 3-input batch is used, the accuracy improves
to 99.95% for the clean IC and 100% for IC with Trojan
as seen in Figures 11(a), 11(b). The false positive rate is
0.09% and the false negative rate is 0%. A larger batch size
is required for challenging Trojans. During deployment, only
1 input or 3 inputs are sufficient. When IC-to-IC variations
are considered and one input is used to test, the false negative
rate for data from the clean IC is 2.73% and for Trojaned
IC is 0%. A 3-input batch yields 100% accuracy. Figures
12(a), 12(b) show the time series of anomaly detection for
random variations in ICs for a single input. The accuracy
decreases slightly when process variations are considered. The
perturbations introduced to the IC to simulate are random and
may fall more in the baseline increasing the accuracy.
9(a) Clean IC (b) IC with Trojan inserted in RTL
Fig. 6: Bit flips induced by over-clocking for BasicRSA-T100 without the aging effects.
(a) Clean IC (b) IC with Trojan inserted in RTL
Fig. 7: Bit flips induced by over-clocking for BasicRSA-T100 when aging is maximum.
(a) Clean IC (b) IC with Trojan inserted in RTL
Fig. 8: Weighted locations of bit flips without the aging effects in RSA circuit.
(a) Clean IC (b) IC with Trojan inserted in RTL
Fig. 9: Weighted locations of bit flips when the aging is maximum in RSA circuit.
We over-clocked the circuit by to 4× the frequency of the Trojan-free circuit without aging and tested the classifier.
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(a) Clean IC (b) IC with Trojan inserted in RTL
Fig. 10: Time series of anomaly detection using a single input for RSA circuit.
(a) Clean IC (b) IC with Trojan inserted in RTL
Fig. 11: Time series of anomaly detection using a batch of 3 inputs in RSA circuit.
(a) Clean IC (b) IC with Trojan inserted in RTL
Fig. 12: Anomaly detection for IC-to-IC variation using single input in RSA circuit.
(a) Clean IC (b) IC with Trojan inserted in RTL
Fig. 13: Anomaly detection for pure over-clocking using single input in RSA circuit.
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TABLE I: Classifier performance on Experiments 1 and 2.
RSA (RTL Trojan) RSA (netlist Trojan)
Single input Three inputs Single bin 16 bins
Accuracy 0.9930 0.9995 1.0 1.0
Precision 0.9862 0.9991 0.9504 0.9947
Recall 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
F1 0.9931 0.9995 0.9745 0.9973
Figures 13(a), 13(b) show performance of classifier on over-
clocked data. False positive rate from clean IC is 1.14% and
the false negative rate for the Trojaned IC is 73.69%. Batch
of 3 inputs increases the false negative rate to 81.42%. The
high accuracy obtained for Trojan detection can be attributed
to aging and not just over-clocking. Table I provides accuracy,
precision, recall, and F1 on BasicRSA-T100 (RTL Trojan)
and BasicRSA-T100 (netlist Trojan). The definitions for the
accuracy metrics Accuracy, Precision, Recall and F1 are given
by Equations 9, 10, 11, and 12, respectively:
Accuracy =
TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN
(9)
Precision =
TP
TP + FP
(10)
Recall =
TP
TP + FN
(11)
F1 =
2 ∗ (Recall ∗ Precision)
Recall + Precision
. (12)
where TP = TruePositives, FP = FalsePositives,
TN = TrueNegatives, FN = FalseNegatives.
B. Experiment 2: Basic RSA-T100 Trojan Inserted into Netlist
We make Trojan detection challenging by inserting the Tro-
jan into the synthesized netlist. This makes minimal alterations
to the original design and hence difficult to detect. The Trojan
in this experiment occupies 0.22% of the circuit area. We
collect data in the clock range 0.71 ns – 0.84 ns with a step of
0.005 ns. This range is lower than the RTL inserted one since
the synthesized circuit is similar to the original Trojan-free
circuit. Aggressive over-clocking is to get discernible patterns
of bit errors at the outputs. Figures 14(a), 14(b) show the
histograms of bit flips at output for no aging and Figures 15(a),
15(b) show the histograms for maximum aging. Figures 16(a),
16(b) show the bar charts of weighted location of bit flips
for no aging and Figures 17(a) and 17(b) show the same for
maximum aging. These figures show that the features provide a
discernible difference when the Trojan is inserted in the circuit.
As the Trojan is inserted into the netlist, the overall netlist
will now be different from the previous case (Experiment
1). The number of gates involved and the structure of the
netlist changes. Thus, the bit flip distribution changes from
the previous case.
The features are collected using a bin of 5 inputs at a
time for training the classifier. When a single bin is used for
testing, the accuracy of correctly classifying the Trojan-free
case is 89.47% and for the Trojan case is 100%, as shown
in Figure 18(a) and Figure 18(b), respectively. When 16 bins
are used for testing, the accuracy for the clean IC increases
to 99.47% and that for Trojaned IC remains 100%. When IC-
to-IC variations are considered and single bin input is used to
test, the false negative rate for data from clean IC is 13.45%
and for Trojan inserted IC, it is 0%. A 16-bin input yields
99.57% accuracy. For random variations in ICs, the number
of inputs in the test data set is 4226. Figures 20(a), 20(b) show
the time series of anomaly detection for random variations in
ICs for single input. Table I summarizes the results. Using
smaller number of bins yields more false positives.
C. Experiment 3: AES-T100 Trojan Inserted into RTL and
Netlist
The Trojan in this experiment occupies 0.23% of the circuit
area. The netlist generated by inserting Trojan at the RTL is
same as the one obtained after inserting Trojans in the netlist.
So we will show the results for one case. Since this Trojan
is harder to detect (4209 paths away from the critical path)
and the circuit is complex, the performance decreases when
a single input is used for testing. Therefore, we enhance the
features and use several bins containing different number of
inputs at a time (during training and inference). For the AES
circuit, the maximum clock that the circuit can be synthesized
is 0.57 ns. We collect data in the clock range of 0.45 ns - 0.55
ns in steps of 0.005 ns. The data is generated for 4340 inputs.
Figures 21(a) and 21(b) show the histograms of bit flips for
no aging and Figures 22(a), 22(b) show the histograms for
maximum aging. The number of bit flips have been increased
from the no aging case to the worst aging case as can be
seen by the shift in the histogram towards right. Figures 23(a),
23(b) show the bar charts of weighted locations of bit flips at
outputs for no aging. Whereas, Figures 24(a) and 24(b) show
the bar charts for maximum aging. The location of bit flips
is concentrated on the least significant bits of the output. In
each round of AES algorithm, “Shift Rows” operation rotates
the bits by an amount that depends on their position. This
induces more operations on most significant bits than that of
least significant bits. Thus, the bit flips are more concentrated
towards the end. Additionally, there is a change in bit-flip
distribution and locations of bit flips from no aging to the worst
aging case and the Trojan free circuit to the Trojaned circuit.
These figures show that these features provide a discernible
difference when a Trojan is inserted.
With a single bin input (bin size = 5), the accuracy of
correctly classifying a Trojan-free IC is 75.77% and that for a
Trojaned IC is 98.98% (Figures 25(a) and 25(b), respectively).
To reduce the false positive rate, we use a multiple-bin input.
Using a batch of 32-bins increases the accuracy to 99.71%
for classifying a Trojan-free IC and 100% accuracy when
detecting a Trojaned IC (Figures 26(a) and 26(b)). When IC-
to-IC variations are considered and a single bin input is used,
the false negative rate for data from clean IC is 24.91% and
for Trojan-infected IC is 0.87% (Figures 27(a), 27(b)). A 32-
bin input yields 99.29% and 100% accuracy for clean and
Trojan-infected IC. The resulting precision for the classifier is
presented in Table II.
12
(a) Clean IC (b) IC with Trojan inserted into netlist
Fig. 14: Bit flips induced by over clocking without the aging effects in RSA circuit.
(a) Clean IC (b) IC with Trojan inserted into netlist
Fig. 15: Bit flips exacerbated by over clocking when the aging is maximum in the RSA circuit.
(a) Clean IC (b) IC with Trojan inserted into netlist
Fig. 16: Weighted locations of bit flips without the aging effects in RSA circuit.
(a) Clean IC (b) IC with Trojan inserted into netlist
Fig. 17: Weighted locations of bit flips when the aging is maximum in RSA circuit.
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(a) Clean IC (b) IC with Trojan inserted into netlist
Fig. 18: Time series of anomaly detection using a single bin for RSA circuit.
(a) Clean IC (b) IC with Trojan inserted into netlist
Fig. 19: Time series of anomaly detection using a batch of 16-bins for RSA circuit.
(a) Clean IC (b) IC with Trojan inserted into netlist
Fig. 20: Anomaly detection for IC-to-IC variation using single bin for RSA circuit.
D. Experiment 4: AES-T1000 Trojan Inserted into RTL and
Netlist
The Trojan in this experiment occupies roughly 0.3% of
the circuit area. Figures 28(a), 28(b) show the histograms of
bit flips for no aging case and Figures 29(a), 29(b) show the
histograms for maximum aging. The number of bit flips have
been increased from the no aging case to the worst aging case
as can be seen by the shift in the histogram towards right.
Figures 30(a), 30(b) show the bit flips of weighted location
at outputs for no aging case. Whereas, Figures 30(c), 30(d)
show the bar charts for maximum aging. As explained in the
previous section (Experiment 3), the locations of bit flips are
concentrated more towards the end. The bit flips and their
locations vary from no aging case to worst aging case as well
as Trojan free case to Trojan inserted case. These figures show
that the chosen features provide a discernible difference when
the Trojan is inserted. With single bin as input (bin size of 5),
the accuracy for correctly classifying Trojan-free IC is 75.72%
and that for Trojaned IC is 99.16% as shown in Figures 31(a),
31(b), respectively. When a batch of 32-bins is used, accuracy
increases to 99.85% for classifying Trojan-free IC and an
accuracy of 100% for detecting Trojan IC as in Figure 32(a),
Figure 32(b), respectively. Table II summarizes the precision
of the model on AES-T100 and AES-T1000 when using single
or multiple inputs. Figures 33(a), 33(b) show the ROC curves
(true vs false positives at different thresholds). Considering IC-
to-IC variations and a single bin as input, the false negative rate
for data from clean IC is 20.33% and 0.87% for a Trojaned IC
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(a) Clean IC (b) IC with Trojan
Fig. 21: Bit flips induced by over-clocking for AES-T100 with no aging.
(a) Clean IC (b) IC with Trojan
Fig. 22: Bit flips induced by over-clocking for AES-T100 with maximum aging.
(a) Clean IC (b) IC with Trojan
Fig. 23: Distribution of bit flip locations for AES-T100 without the aging effects.
(a) Clean IC (b) IC with Trojan
Fig. 24: Distribution of bit flip locations for AES-T100 when maximum aging is considered.
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(a) Clean IC (b) IC with Trojan
Fig. 25: Time series of anomaly detection using a single bin for AES-T100.
(a) Clean IC (b) IC with Trojan
Fig. 26: Time series of anomaly detection using a batch of 32 bins for AES-T100.
(a) Clean IC (b) IC with Trojan
Fig. 27: Anomaly detection for IC-to-IC variation with a single bin for AES-T100.
as in Figures 34(a), 34(b). A batch of 32-bins yields 99.15%
accuracy for clean and 100% accuracy for Trojaned IC.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This study shows effectiveness of controlled aging in detect-
ing Trojans. A machine learning classifier and feature selection
distinguishes genuine ICs from the ICs in which Trojans are far
off the critical path. Over-clocking alone does not distinguish
genuine ICs from Trojan-inserted ones. Over-clocking plus
aging provides sufficient patterns of output bit errors to detect
Trojans. A high detection accuracy is achieved with 32-bins
as input with a bin size of 5 in case of AES circuits. We will
study detection of the smallest Trojan on and off the critical
path. We will consider cell libraries at different voltages so
that aging is better approximated using fast voltage switching.
While this is a detailed simulation study, it is interesting to
demonstrate the method on complex circuits and Trojans and
on real ICs.
REFERENCES
[1] F. G. Wolff, C. A. Papachristou, S. Bhunia, and R. S. Chakraborty, “To-
wards trojan-free trusted ics: Problem analysis and detection scheme,”
2008 Design, Automation and Test in Europe, pp. 1362–1365, 2008.
[2] D. Agrawal, S. Baktir, D. Karakoyunlu, P. Rohatgi, and B. Sunar, “Trojan
detection using ic fingerprinting,” 2007 IEEE Symposium on Security
and Privacy (SP ’07), pp. 296–310, 2007.
[3] R. S. Chakraborty, F. Wolff, S. Paul, C. Papachristou, and S. Bhunia,
“Mero: A statistical approach for hardware trojan detection,” in Pro-
ceedings of the International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and
Embedded Systems. Springer, 2009, pp. 396–410.
16
(a) Clean IC (b) IC with Trojan
Fig. 28: Bit flips induced by over-clocking for AES-T1000 without aging effects.
(a) Clean IC (b) IC with Trojan
Fig. 29: Bit flips induced by over-clocking for AES-T1000 when aging is maximum.
(a) Clean IC (b) IC with Trojan
(c) Clean IC (d) IC with Trojan
Fig. 30: AES-T1000 bit flip distribution for no aging (top) and max. aging (bottom).
17
(a) Clean IC (b) IC with Trojan
Fig. 31: Time series of anomaly detection using a single input for AES-T1000.
(a) Clean IC (b) IC with Trojan
Fig. 32: Time series of anomaly detection using 32 bins input for AES-T1000.
(a) AES-T100 (b) AES-T1000
Fig. 33: ROC curves for different thresholds using a single input and with a bin size of k = 5.
(a) Clean IC (b) IC with Trojan
Fig. 34: Anomaly detection for IC-to-IC variation with a single bin for AES-T1000.
18
TABLE II: Precision on AES T100, T1000 for different values of k (size of bin).
AES-T100 AES-T1000
Single bin 16 bins 32 bins Single bin 16 bins 32 bins
k = 1 0.5680 0.5083 0.5047 0.7579 0.9217 0.9835
k = 3 0.7520 0.8918 0.9758 0.8840 0.9962 1.0
k = 5 0.7972 0.9256 0.9935 0.9103 0.9991 1.0
[4] Y. Huang, S. Bhunia, and P. Mishra, “Mers: statistical test generation
for side-channel analysis based trojan detection,” in Proceedings of the
ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security,
2016, pp. 130–141.
[5] J. Aarestad, D. Acharyya, R. Rad, and J. Plusquellic, “Detecting trojans
through leakage current analysis using multiple supply pad iddqs,” IEEE
Transactions on information forensics and security, vol. 5, no. 4, pp.
893–904, 2010.
[6] D. Forte, C. Bao, and A. Srivastava, “Temperature tracking: An innova-
tive run-time approach for hardware trojan detection,” in Proceedings of
the International Conference on Computer-Aided Design. IEEE Press,
2013, pp. 532–539.
[7] F. Stellari, P. Song, A. J. Weger, J. Culp, A. Herbert, and D. Pfeiffer,
“Verification of untrusted chips using trusted layout and emission
measurements,” in Proceedings of the IEEE international symposium
on hardware-oriented security and trust (HOST), 2014, pp. 19–24.
[8] M. Tehranipoor and F. Koushanfar, “A survey of hardware trojan
taxonomy and detection,” IEEE design & test of computers, vol. 27,
no. 1, pp. 10–25, 2010.
[9] R. Karri, J. Rajendran, K. Rosenfeld, and M. Tehranipoor, “Trustworthy
hardware: Identifying and classifying hardware trojans,” Computer,
vol. 43, no. 10, pp. 39–46, 2010.
[10] M. Tehranipoor and C. Wang, Introduction to hardware security and
trust. Springer Science & Business Media, 2011.
[11] K. Basu, S. M. Saeed, C. Pilato, M. Ashraf, M. T. Nabeel,
K. Chakrabarty, and R. Karri, “Cad-base: An attack vector into the
electronics supply chain,” ACM Transactions on Design Automation of
Electronic Systems (TODAES), vol. 24, no. 4, p. 38, 2019.
[12] C. Pilato, K. Basu, F. Regazzoni, and R. Karri, “Black-hat high-level
synthesis: Myth or reality?” IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale
Integration (VLSI) Systems, 2018.
[13] S. T. King, J. Tucek, A. Cozzie, C. Grier, W. Jiang, and Y. Zhou,
“Designing and implementing malicious hardware.” Leet, vol. 8, pp.
1–8, 2008.
[14] C. Dunbar and G. Qu, “Designing trusted embedded systems from finite
state machines,” ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems
(TECS), vol. 13, no. 5s, p. 153, 2014.
[15] X. Zhang and M. Tehranipoor, “Case study: Detecting hardware trojans
in third-party digital ip cores,” in Proceedings of the IEEE International
Symposium on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust, 2011, pp. 67–70.
[16] K. Xiao, D. Forte, Y. Jin, R. Karri, S. Bhunia, and M. Tehranipoor,
“Hardware trojans: Lessons learned after one decade of research,” ACM
Transactions on Design Automation of Electronic Systems (TODAES),
vol. 22, no. 1, p. 6, 2016.
[17] M. Hicks, M. Finnicum, S. T. King, M. M. Martin, and J. M. Smith,
“Overcoming an untrusted computing base: Detecting and removing ma-
licious hardware automatically,” in Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium
on Security and Privacy, 2010, pp. 159–172.
[18] Y. Jin and Y. Makris, “Hardware trojan detection using path delay
fingerprint,” in Proceedings of the IEEE International workshop on
hardware-oriented security and trust, 2008, pp. 51–57.
[19] N. Patel, P. Krishnamurthy, H. Amrouch, M. Shamouilian, J. Henkel,
R. Karri, and F. Khorrami, “Towards a new thermal monitor-
ing based framework for embedded cps device security,” IEEE
Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, 2020, DOI:
10.1109/TDSC.2020.2973959.
[20] H. Amrouch, P. Krishnamurthy, N. Patel, J. Henkel, R. Karri, and
F. Khorrami, “Emerging (un-)reliability based security threats and mit-
igations for embedded systems: Special session,” in Proceedings of the
International Conference on Compilers, Architectures and Synthesis for
Embedded Systems Companion. Association for Computing Machinery,
2017, Article 17.
[21] V. M. van Santen, H. Amrouch, N. Parihar, S. Mahapatra, and J. Henkel,
“Aging-aware voltage scaling,” in Proceedings of the Design, Automa-
tion Test in Europe Conference Exhibition (DATE), March 2016, pp.
576–581.
[22] H. Amrouch, B. Khaleghi, A. Gerstlauer, and J. Henkel, “Reliability-
aware design to suppress aging,” in Proceedings of the ACM/EDAC/IEEE
Design Automation Conference (DAC), June 2016, pp. 1–6.
[23] H. Amrouch, S. Mishra, V. van Santen, S. Mahapatra, and J. Henkel,
“Impact of bti on dynamic and static power: From the physical to circuit
level,” in Proceedings of the IEEE International Reliability Physics
Symposium (IRPS), April 2017, pp. CR–3.1–CR–3.6.
[24] N. Parihar, N. Goel, S. Mukhopadhyay, and S. Mahapatra, “Bti analysis
tool-modeling of nbti dc, ac stress and recovery time kinetics, nitrogen
impact, and eol estimation,” IEEE Transactions on Electron Devices,
vol. 65, no. 2, pp. 392–403, Feb 2018.
[25] SILVACO. (2011) Pdk 45nm open cell library. [On-
line]. Available: https://www.silvaco.com/products/nangate/FreePDK45
Open Cell Library/index.html
[26] ASU. (2011) Predictive technology model. [Online]. Available:
http://ptm.asu.edu/
[27] TetraMAX ATPG User Guide, Synopsys Inc., 2018, version O-2018.06.
[28] H. Salmani, M. Tehranipoor, and R. Karri, “On design vulnerability
analysis and trust benchmarks development,” in Proceedings of the IEEE
International Conference on Computer Design (ICCD), Oct 2013, pp.
471–474.
[29] Design Compiler User Guide, Synopsys Inc., 2018, version O-2018.06.
[30] PrimeTime User Guide, Synopsys Inc., 2014, version J-2014.12.
[31] VCS User Guide, Synopsys Inc., 2014, version J-2014.12.
[32] B. Gassend, D. Clarke, M. van Dijk, and S. Devadas, “Controlled
physical random functions,” in Proceedings of the Annual Computer
Security Applications Conference. IEEE, Dec 2002, pp. 149–160.
[33] S. Natarajan, M. Agostinelli, S. Akbar, M. Bost, A. Bowonder,
V. Chikarmane, S. Chouksey, A. Dasgupta, K. Fischer, Q. Fu, T. Ghani,
M. P. Giles, S. Govindaraju, R. Grover, W. wei Han, D. G. Hanken,
E. Haralson, M. Haran, M. Heckscher, R. Heussner, P. Jain, R. M.
James, R. R. Jhaveri, I. Jin, H. Kam, E. Karl, C. Kenyon, M. Liu,
Y. Luo, R. Mehandru, S. Morarka, L. Neiberg, P. Packan, A. Paliwal,
C. Parker, P. Patel, R. B. Patel, C. M. Pelto, L. C. Pipes, P. S. Plekhanov,
M. Prince, S. Rajamani, J. Sandford, B. E. Sell, S. Sivakumar, P. Smith,
B. Song, K. Tone, T. Tro¨ger, J. Wiedemer, M.-B. Yang, and K. Zhang,
“A 14nm logic technology featuring 2nd-generation finfet, air-gapped
interconnects, self-aligned double patterning and a 0.0588 u m2 sram
cell size,” 2014 IEEE International Electron Devices Meeting, pp. 3.7.1–
3.7.3, 2014.
Virinchi Roy Surabhi received his B.Tech. degree
in electrical engineering from the Indian Institute of
Technology, Kanpur, India, in 2018. He is currently
working toward the Ph.D. degree at NYU Tandon
School of Engineering. His research interests include
robotics, artificial intelligence and cyber-physical
systems.
19
Prashanth Krishnamurthy received his B.Tech.
degree in electrical engineering from Indian Institute
of Technology, Chennai in 1999, and M.S. and Ph.D.
degrees in electrical engineering from Polytechnic
University (now NYU), Brooklyn, NY in 2002 and
2006, respectively. He is currently a Research Sci-
entist and Adjunct Faculty with the Department
of Electrical and Computer Engineering at NYU
Tandon School of Engineering, NY, and a Senior
Researcher with FarCo Technologies, NY. He has
co-authored over 120 journal and conference papers
in the broad areas of autonomous systems, robotics, and control systems. He
has also co-authored the book “Modeling and Adaptive Nonlinear Control of
Electric Motors” published by Springer Verlag in 2003. His research interests
include autonomous vehicles and robotic systems, multi-agent systems, sensor
data fusion, robust and adaptive nonlinear control, resilient control, path plan-
ning and obstacle avoidance, machine learning, real-time embedded systems,
electromechanical systems modeling and control, cyber-physical systems
and cyber-security, decentralized and large-scale systems, high-fidelity and
hardware-in-the-loop simulation, and real-time software implementations.
Hussam Amrouch (S’11, M’15) is a Research
Group Leader at the Chair for Embedded Systems
(CES), Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT),
Germany. He is leading of the Dependable Hard-
ware research group. He received his Ph.D. degree
(Summa cum laude) degree from KIT in 2015. His
main research interests are emerging technologies,
design for reliability from physics to system level
and machine learning. He holds seven HiPEAC
Paper Awards. He has three best paper nominations
at DAC’16, DAC’17 and DATE’17 for his work on
reliability. He currently serves as Associate Editor at Integration, the VLSI
Journal. He is a member of the IEEE. ORCID 0000-0002-5649-3102
Kanad Basu received his Ph.D. from the department
of computer and information science and engineer-
ing, University of Florida. His thesis was focused
on improving signal observability for post-silicon
validation. Post-Phd, he worked in various semi-
conductor companies like IBM and Synopsys. At
IBM, he was responsible for the design on IBM
Power and Z Processors. At Synopsys, he helped
in development of DFTMAX Ultra, the state of the
art low pin hardware test solution. During his PhD
days, he did internships at Intel. Currently, he is
an Assistant Research Professor at the Electrical and Computer Engineering
Department of NYU. He has authored 2 US patents, 1 book chapter and
several peer reviewed journal and conference articles. Dr. Basu was awarded
the ”Best Paper Award” at the International Conference on VLSI Design 2011.
His current research interests are hardware and systems security. He is an
Associate Editor for IET Computers and Digital Technology Journal and a
Guest Editor for Springer Journal of Electronic Testing. He has served as
a Program Committee members for various conferences including the VLSI
Design Conference, Asian Test Symposium, etc.
Jo¨rg Henkel (M’95-SM’01-F’15) is the Chair Pro-
fessor for Embedded Systems at Karlsruhe Institute
of Technology. Before that he was a research staff
member at NEC Laboratories in Princeton, NJ. He
received his diploma and Ph.D. (Summa cum laude)
from the Technical University of Braunschweig. His
research work is focused on co-design for embedded
hardware/software systems with respect to power,
thermal and reliability aspects. He has received
six best paper awards throughout his career from,
among others, ICCAD, ESWeek and DATE. For two
consecutive terms he served as the Editor-in-Chief for the ACM Transactions
on Embedded Computing Systems. He is currently the Editor-in-Chief of the
IEEE Design&Test Magazine and is/has been an Associate Editor for major
ACM and IEEE Journals. He has led several conferences as a General Chair
incl. ICCAD, ESWeek and serves as a Steering Committee chair/member for
leading conferences and journals for embedded and cyber-physical systems.
Prof. Henkel coordinates the DFG program SPP 1500 “Dependable Embedded
Systems” and is a site coordinator of the DFG TR89 collaborative research
center on “Invasive Computing”. He is the chairman of the IEEE Computer
Society, Germany Chapter, and a Fellow of the IEEE.
Ramesh Karri is a Professor of ECE at New
York University. He co-directs the NYU Center for
Cyber Security (http://cyber.nyu.edu). He also leads
the Cyber Security thrust of the NY State Center
for Advanced Telecommunications Technologies at
NYU. He co-founded the Trust-Hub (http://trust-
hub.org) and organizes the Embedded Systems Chal-
lenge (https://csaw.engineering.nyu.edu/esc), the an-
nual red team blue team event. He has a Ph.D. in
computer science and engineering, from the UC San
Diego and a B.E in ece from Andhra University. His
research and education activities in hardware cybersecurity include trustworthy
ICs; processors and cyber-physical systems; security-aware computer-aided
design, test, verification, validation, and reliability; nano meets security; hard-
ware security competitions, benchmarks and metrics; biochip security; additive
manufacturing security. He has published over 240 articles in leading journals
and conference proceedings. Karri’s work on hardware cybersecurity received
best paper nominations (ICCD 2015 and DFTS 2015) and awards (ACM
TODAES 2018, ITC 2014, CCS 2013, DFTS 2013 and VLSI Design 2012).
He received the Humboldt Fellowship and the National Science Foundation
CAREER Award. He serves on the editorial boards of several IEEE and ACM
Transactions (TIFS, TCAD, TODAES, ESL, D&T, JETC). He served as an
IEEE Computer Society Distinguished Visitor (2013-2015). He served on
the Executive Committee of the IEEE/ACM Design Automation Conference
leading the SecurityDAC initiative (2014-2017). He delivers invited keynotes,
talks, and tutorials on Hardware Security and Trust (ESRF, DAC, DATE, VTS,
ITC, ICCD, NATW, LATW, CROSSING, etc.). He co-founded the IEEE/ACM
NANOARCH Symposium and served as program/general chair of conferences
( IEEE ICCD, IEEE HOST, IEEE DFTS, NANOARCH, RFIDSEC and
WISEC). He serves on several program committees (DAC, ICCAD, HOST,
ITC, VTS, ETS, ICCD, DTIS, WIFS).
20
Farshad Khorrami received his Bachelors degrees
in mathematics and electrical engineering in 1982
and 1984 respectively from The Ohio State Uni-
versity. He also received his Master’s degree in
mathematics and Ph.D. in electrical engineering in
1984 and 1988 from The Ohio State University.
He is currently a professor of Electrical & Com-
puter Engineering Department at NYU, Brooklyn,
NY where he joined as an assistant professor in
Sept. 1988. His research interests include adaptive
and nonlinear controls, robotics and automation,
unmanned vehicles, cyber security for cyber-physical systems, embedded
systems security, machine learning, and large-scale systems and decentralized
control. He has published more than 280 refereed journal and conference
papers in these areas. His book “Modeling and Adaptive Nonlinear Control
of Electric Motors” was published by Springer Verlag in 2003. He also has
thirteen U.S. patents on novel smart micro-positioners and actuators, control
systems, security, and wireless sensors and actuators. He has developed and
directed the Control/Robotics Research Laboratory at Polytechnic University
(Now NYU). He has also commercialized UAVs as well as development of
auto-pilots for various unmanned vehicles. His research has been supported by
the ARO, NSF, ONR, DARPA, ARL, AFRL, NASA, and several corporations.
He has served as general chair and conference organizing committee member
of several international conferences.
